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Abstract
In this paper, we characterize optimal regulatory policies composed of pollution
standards, probabilities of inspection and ￿nes for non-compliance, in a context
where both monitoring and sanctioning are socially costly, and penalties may include
gravity and non-gravity components at the regulator￿ s discretion. The optimal
policy entails compliance with the standards as long as a quite intuitive condition is
met. Non-compliant policies may include standards even below the pollution levels
that minimize the sum of abatement costs and external damages. Interestingly, the
appropriate structure of penalties under non-compliance is highly progressive, while
the best possible shape of the ￿nes under compliance is linear only if non-gravity
sanctions are not allowed.
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11 Introduction
Environmental regulations often require polluting agents to comply with pollution limits
or standards. For example, the EPA￿ s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Program of the Clean Water Act requires facilities which discharge pollutants into waters
of the US to obtain a permit to release speci￿c amounts of pollution. Such facilities include
direct and indirect dischargers, as well as Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs),
that is, wastewater treatment plants owned by municipalities and local sewer districts.
According to Harrington (2003), the rates of non-compliance from the mid-1980s to
the mid-1990s ranked between 6% and 14% for direct dischargers, between 9% and 11%
for POTWs, and about 54% in the case of indirect dischargers.1 The EPA￿ s OSWER
Directive 0610.12 provides some examples of imposed penalties, following the Civil Penalty
Policy of the Clean Water Act.2 These penalties contain a gravity component, directly
related to the degree of non-compliance; and also a non-gravity part, which considers
extra conditions such as the economic impact of the penalty on the violator or economic
bene￿ts of non-compliance, such as illegal pro￿ts or competitive advantage. According to
the mentioned Directive, the ￿nal structure of the sanction is case-based: the non-gravity
component varies from nearly 3% to almost 84% of the total penalty.3
These numbers suggest that non-compliant behavior is signi￿cant, and also that there
1This includes violations of standards and other requirements also, such as self-monitoring or reporting.
Nevertheless, 35% of the non-compliant indirect dischargers were in violation of the standards.
2Consult www.epa.gov for more information on this issue.
3In fact, there exists ￿ exibility regarding the ￿nal structure of the penalties, with the limit of the
violator￿ s statutory maximum civil penalty liability. In particular, under the EPA￿ s Audit Policy, it is
possible to reduce up to 100% of the non-gravity-based penalties and 75% of the gravity-based penalties
in exchange for ￿rms￿good-faith, documented evidence of compliance-promoting activities.does not exist a clear pattern of the appropriate shape of the penalties. Surprisingly,
the existing theoretical literature on optimum enforcement has not considered the men-
tioned binary structure of the ￿nes.4 Moreover, non-compliance has not been rationalized;
that is, the problem of ￿nding the optimal policy composed of pollution standards, in-
spection probabilities and ￿nes, considering that the best possible policy may induce
non-compliance, has not been solved. In the present paper, we address these issues.5
We consider a simple model composed of a regulator and a polluting ￿rm. The regula-
tor sets a pollution standard and a probability of inspection which minimizes social costs
(i.e., the sum of abatement costs, external damages and enforcement costs, i.e., moni-
toring and sanctioning costs), considering the optimal behavior of the ￿rm with respect
to the policy. Sanctions for non-compliance contain both a non-gravity and a gravity
component, the latter being strictly increasing and convex in the degree of violation. In
the ￿rst part of the paper, we consider given ￿nes, i.e., chosen by an institution di⁄erent
from the regulator. Later on, we allow the regulator to choose the penalty as well.
Under given ￿nes, we ￿nd that the optimal policy induces compliance under low
monitoring costs relative to sanctioning costs, and when sanctions are not very progressive
4Consult Polinsky and Shavell (2000) for an excellent survey on public enforcement of the law, which
started with Becker (1968). Some examples are Polinsky and Shavell (1979, 1991), Bebchuck and Kaplow
(1991) or Bose (1993). Within the environmental context, see the literature reviews by Heyes (2000) and
Cohen (1999), and also Heyes (1996), Segerson and Tietenberg (1992) or Arguedas (2005).
5A recent paper by Stranlund (2007) considers the design of emissions trading programs which induce
either compliance or non-compliance, to achieve a ￿xed aggregate emissions target cost-e⁄ectively. Up
to our knowledge, this is the closest paper to ours, although the (overall) induced pollution level is ￿xed
in Stranlund (2007), while it is a decision variable of regulators here. Therefore, the present paper also
allows to obtain desired pollution levels. Arguedas and Hamoudi (2004) consider a similar framework
in the context of pollution standards, where ￿nes are quadratic in the degree of non-compliance and
there are no sanctioning costs. The purpose of that paper is not to ￿nd the best possible ￿ne structure,
but to analyze polluters￿incentives to invest in environmentally friendly technologies, given possible ￿ne
reductions contingent on adoption and alternative timings for policy announcements.
3in the degree of non-compliance. Interestingly, this condition reduces to the requirement
found in Stranlund (2007) under his particular assumptions on the penalty function.6
However, the pollution level is endogenously determined in our model, while it is given
in Stranlund (2007). This allows us to show that compliant policies may be characterized
by lenient standards, in contrast with non-compliant policies. In fact, under compliance,
we ￿nd that the optimal standard is above the pollution level which minimizes the sum of
abatement costs and external damages, a result in accordance with the literature which
is due to costly monitoring, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000). Conversely, under non-
compliance, the optimal standard is below, as long as sanctioning costs are low enough.7
Regarding the appropriate shape of the ￿ne, the regulator can cheaply maintain com-
pliance if the marginal sanction of an in￿nitesimal violation is high enough. This is
possible when the linear component of the sanction is large. When the optimal policy
induces non-compliance, the optimal non-gravity sanction is zero, since it does not mar-
ginally a⁄ect the behavior of the ￿rm and it only causes sanctioning costs. The preferred
shape of the penalty in this case is su¢ ciently progressive. This result seems contrary to
the literature on crime, where an increase in the sanction increases compliance.8 However,
there the standard is given. Here, the standard is endogenously determined, and there-
6Stranlund (2007) assumes a perfectly competitive market for tradable permits, where ￿rms are price-
takers. Firms cannot strategically react to change penalties (for polluting more than the quantity of
permits they hold) in their favor either. In that sense, our paper and Stranlund (2007) have a common
feature, that is, to assume that ￿rms act passively in the policy setting. This then leads to a similar
condition for the social preference of compliance.
7The optimal standard is zero if there are no sanctioning costs, a result shown in Arguedas and
Hamoudi (2004), since it is possible to induce a given pollution level constant decreasing both the standard
and the probability of inspection. This is equivalent to increasing the ￿ne and decreasing the probability,
in accordance with Becker (1968). An example of this practise is the zero discharge goal of the Clean
Water Act, see Harrington (2003).
8Kambhu (1989), Malik (1990a), Harrington (1988) or Livernois and McKenna (1999) are exceptions.
4fore, it changes when the sanction changes. A particular pollution level is then induced
with a su¢ ciently large progressiveness of the sanction and a su¢ ciently low standard.
Given a non-compliant policy, it is always possible to ￿nd an equivalent compliant
policy which achieves the same outcome at lower social costs. This result is in accordance
with Stranlund (2007). We then argue that non-compliance can be justi￿ed on political
grounds, as long as the pressure from environmental groups is signi￿cant with respect to
the application of the polluter pays principle. Whatever the ￿nal outcome, we o⁄er a clear
recommendation: collected penalties should be highly progressive gravity-based.
This paper contributes to the literature on standard setting, and more speci￿cally, on
non-compliance and the design of optimal ￿nes. Downing and Watson (1974) were the
￿rst to present a theoretical model of environmental policy enforcement. Harford (1978)
focusses on ￿rms￿behavior with respect to imperfectly enforceable emission standards
and taxes. In the context of emissions trading policies, several papers assume imperfect
enforcement, such as Malik (1990b), Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) or Montero (2002).
Ellis (1992), Stranlund and Chavez (2000) and Amacher and Malik (1996) study optimal
policies constrained to induce compliance. More recently, Arguedas (2005) ￿nds that
optimal policies induce non-compliance, when ￿rms and regulators negotiate on the level
of the ￿nes in exchange for ￿rms￿adoption of clean technologies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model. In Section 3, we study the optimal behavior of the ￿rm. In Section 4, we analyze
the optimal policy under given penalties. In Section 5, we discuss the appropriate shape
of the ￿nes. We conclude in Section 6. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
52 The Model
A single ￿rm generates pollution denoted by e 2 [0;e0], where e0 is the pollution level
emitted in the absence of any regulation. Pollution can be abated at a cost c(e); with
the usual assumptions c0 (e) < 0, c00 (e) > 0 and c(e0) = 0:9 Pollution generates external
damages measured by the function d(e), such that d0 (e) > 0, d00 (e) ￿ 0 and d(0) = 0.
Let ew be the pollution level that minimizes the sum of abatement costs and external
damages, that is, ew = argmine￿0 fc(e) + d(e)g. Our assumptions ensure 0 ￿ ew < e0.
We assume there exists a regulator who sets a standard s 2 [0;e0], that is, a maximum
amount of permitted pollution. The regulator cannot observe the pollution level selected
by the ￿rm unless it engages in a monitoring activity, which is costly and perfectly ac-
curate. The cost per inspection is m > 0. Due to monitoring costs, it is generally not
desirable to inspect the ￿rm in every instance but only occasionally, that is, with proba-
bility p 2 [0;1]. Once inspected, if the ￿rm is discovered violating the standard (e > s),
then it is forced to pay a penalty that depends on the degree of non-compliance, e ￿ s,
and it is represented by the function F (e ￿ s) = F0 + f (e ￿ s), where f (e ￿ s) > 0;
f0 (e ￿ s) > 0 and f00 (e ￿ s) > 0 for all e > s and f (e ￿ s) = 0 for all e ￿ s:10 Thus,
F0 ￿ 0 is the non-gravity based sanction and f (e ￿ s) is the gravity-based component.
Sanctioning is socially costly, too. Let t ￿ 0 represent the per-unit social cost of
collecting ￿nes. Initially, we assume that the sanction is ￿xed by a government entity other
than the regulator, for example, the judiciary, and study the features of the regulatory
problem under given penalty structures. We relax this assumption in Section 5.
9Throughout the paper, we assume that third order derivatives are negligible.
10When appropriate, we discuss how our results change under linear penalties (f00 = 0).
6Given F (e ￿ s), we consider a principal-agent framework where the regulator chooses
the pollution standard and the inspection probability which minimizes social costs, con-
sidering the optimal response of the ￿rm to the policy. We consider the sub-game perfect
equilibrium concept. Therefore, we solve the problem backwards, that is, we ￿rst ￿nd
the ￿rm￿ s optimal pollution level, and we then obtain the optimal policy that minimizes
social costs considering the ￿rm￿ s optimal response.
Given the policy s;p and F (e ￿ s), the ￿rm chooses the pollution level that minimizes
the sum of abatement costs and expected penalties for non-compliance:
C (s;p) = min
e￿0
fc(e) + p[F0 + f (e ￿ s)]g;
s: t: e ￿ s ￿ 0: (1)
The regulator selects the policy that minimizes social costs, which contain ￿rm￿ s abate-
ment costs, generated damages, expected monitoring costs and expected sanctioning costs:
SC (s;p) = c(e) + d(e) + p[m + tF (e ￿ s)]; (2)
where e = e(s;p) ￿ e0 is the ￿rm￿ s optimal response to the policy.
3 The Behavior of the Firm
Given s;p and F (e ￿ s), the ￿rm solves problem (1). The ￿rm never selects a pollution
level below the standard. The ￿rm￿ s expected costs are just abatement costs when e < s,
which are strictly decreasing in the pollution level. Therefore, if the ￿rm complies, it
chooses e = s. However, if the ￿rm does not comply, it chooses e = n > s, given by:
c
0 (n) + pf
0 (n ￿ s) = 0: (3)
7Implicitly di⁄erentiating (3), we obtain the relationship between the chosen pollution
level and, respectively, the probability of inspection and the standard:
np (s;p) = ￿
f0 (n ￿ s)
c00 (n) + pf00 (n ￿ s)
< 0; (4)
ns (s;p) =
pf00 (n ￿ s)
c00 (n) + pf00 (n ￿ s)
> 0: (5)
These results are in accordance with Harford (1978). The pollution level selected by
the ￿rm is decreasing in the probability of inspection and increasing in the standard.
Also, the degree of violation is decreasing in the standard, since ns (s;p) < 1.11
Whether the ￿rm decides to comply with the standard depends on the ￿xed compo-
nent of the sanction, and also on the relationship between marginal abatement costs and
marginal expected ￿nes. The following lemma provides the result.
Lemma 1 Given s;p and F (e ￿ s), the optimal pollution level e(s;p) is the following:
(i) If F0 = 0, then e(s;p) =
￿
s; if c0 (s) + pf0 (0) ￿ 0;
n; if c0 (s) + pf0 (0) < 0:
(ii) If F0 > 0, then e(s;p) =
(
s; if p ￿
c(s)￿c(n)
F0+f(n￿s);
n; if p <
c(s)￿c(n)
F0+f(n￿s):
Consider ￿rst the case where F0 = 0. The ￿rm complies (does not comply) with the
standard if the savings in abatement costs of in￿nitesimally exceeding the standard are
smaller (larger) than the marginal expected penalty. If the sanction includes a non-gravity
component F0 > 0, the expected cost function of the ￿rm is discontinuous at e = s: In
this case, the ￿rm complies (does not comply) with the standard if the expected costs
of complying are smaller (larger) than those of non-complying. Everything else equal, a
su¢ ciently large F0 ensures ￿rm￿ s compliance, since F0 does not a⁄ect marginal behavior
and it increases ￿rm￿ s expected costs only in the event of non-compliance.
11Note that ns (s;p) = 0 when either f00 = 0 (i.e., when the sanction is linear) or p = 0.
8From Lemma 1, there exists a threshold probability of inspection above which the ￿rm





f0(0); if F0 = 0;
pc (s); if F0 > 0;
(6)
where pc (s) is the implicit relationship between p and s when c(s) = c(n) + pF (n ￿ s):
There exists a negative relationship between p and s, since c0 (s) < 0 and c00 (s) > 0:12
The larger the standard, the lower the required probability to induce compliance. Also,
pc (e0) = 0, that is, there is no need to monitor the ￿rm if it is required to comply with
the pollution level e0, the one it would emit in the absence of any regulation.
4 The Optimal Policy under Given Penalties
In this section, we assume that the regulator selects fs;pg, for a given ￿ne structure
F (e ￿ s): The problem is the following:
min
s;p fc(e) + d(e) + pm + ptF (e ￿ s)g;
s. t. e = e(s;p); p 2 [0;1]; s ￿ 0; (7)
where e = e(s;p) is the ￿rm￿ s optimal response, characterized in Lemma 1.
The regulator must decide between a policy which induces compliance, with possibly
larger monitoring costs but without sanctioning costs; or a policy which induces non-
compliance, with sanctioning costs but possibly lower monitoring costs.
We ￿rst provide a su¢ cient condition for the optimal policy to induce compliance.














This result is quite intuitive. Assume that (s￿;p￿) induces compliance, i.e., e(s￿;p￿) =
s￿. From (4) and (5), pollution increases when the inspection probability decreases and
it decreases when the standard decreases. The regulator can maintain the pollution
level constant in￿nitesimally decreasing the standard (this is equivalent to in￿nitesimally
increase the sanction) and decreasing the probability of inspection accordingly. Given an
in￿nitesimal decrease in the standard, the amount of the probability that can be reduced




But, changing the inspection probability and the standard a⁄ect enforcement costs. An
in￿nitesimal decrease in the standard increases sanctioning costs on the amount tpf0 (0).
The corresponding decrease in the probability decreases both monitoring and sanctioning
costs on the amount (m + tF0)
pf00(0)
f0(0) . If the enforcement cost savings of decreasing the
probability (left hand side of (8)) are lower than the additional enforcement costs of
decreasing the standard (right hand side of (8)), then it is not socially convenient to
depart from a policy which induces compliance.
Condition (8) is more likely to hold under low monitoring costs relative to sanctioning
costs. Then, enough e⁄ort can be devoted to induce compliance, since this allows to save
on sanctioning costs.
Condition (8) also depends on the speci￿c structure of the sanction. Clearly, a larger
marginal sanction (the term f0 (0)) increases the sanctioning costs of decreasing the stan-
dard and decreases the enforcement cost savings of decreasing the probability of inspection
10(the latter because a larger marginal sanction increases the response of the ￿rm to a change
in the probability of inspection, see (4)): Therefore, a larger marginal sanction increases
the likelihood of condition (8): By contrast, the progressiveness of the sanction, (the term
f00 (0)) crucially a⁄ects the response of the ￿rm to a change in the standard. A larger
progressiveness implies that the corresponding reduction of the probability is larger, and
therefore, enforcement cost savings of decreasing the probability are larger. Thus, (8)
is more likely to hold when f00 (0) is small. Finally, a lower F0 decreases the social cost
savings of decreasing the probability of inspection, and (8) is more likely.
While (8) is also necessary for compliance to be optimal when F0 = 0, however it
is not when F0 > 0; since social costs are discontinuous at e = s: Then, a su¢ ciently
large F0 might be enough for the optimal policy to induce compliance: it decreases the
minimum probability to induce compliance (which decreases enforcement costs in the
event of compliance, see (6)) and it increases sanctioning costs under non-compliance.
Next, we present the features of the optimal policy constrained to induce compliance.
Proposition 2 If the optimal policy (s￿;p￿) induces compliance, it is characterized by
c0 (s￿) + d0 (s￿) + m
dp(s￿)
ds = 0; where p￿ = p(s￿) is given by (6).
The optimal compliant policy balances abatement costs and expected damages against
monitoring costs. Since
dp(s)
ds < 0, c0 (s￿) + d0 (s￿) > 0. The optimal standard must be set
above ew, the pollution level which minimizes the sum of abatement costs and external
damages. This result is in accordance with the literature, see Polinsky and Shavell (2000),
and it is only due to costly monitoring and not to the particular ￿ne structure.
We now characterize the optimal policy that entails non-compliance.
11Proposition 3 If the optimal policy (s￿;p￿) induces non-compliance, it is given by:
c
0 (n) + d
0 (n) + tp
￿f
0 (n ￿ s
￿) +




0 (n) + p
￿f
0 (n ￿ s
￿) = 0; (10)
(m + t(F (n ￿ s
￿)))
f00 (n ￿ s￿)
f0 (n ￿ s￿)
￿ tf
0 (n ￿ s




(m + t(F (n ￿ s
￿)))
f00 (n ￿ s￿)
f0 (n ￿ s￿)
￿ tf




If sanctioning is socially costless (t = 0), condition (11) reduces to m
pf00
f0 > 0, which
implies s￿ = 0, by (4); (5) and (12). Therefore, the regulator always ￿nd it convenient to
decrease the standard and the probability of inspection to save on monitoring costs.13
Under costly sanctioning, an interior standard is possible, as long as (11) holds with
equality. The standard and the probability are decreased until the cost savings of de-
creasing the probability equal the additional costs of decreasing the standard.14
Combining (9) and (11); we conclude that c0 (n) + d0 (n) > 0.15 The optimal non-
compliant policy induces a pollution level above ew, the pollution level which minimizes
the sum of abatement costs and environmental damages. However, in contrast with the
policy that induces compliance, the standard can be set below ew as long as sanctioning
costs are low enough. To see this, consider the following:
Example 1 Abatement costs are c(e) = e2
2 ￿ 2e and external damages are d(e) = e2
2 .
13Under linear ￿nes, we have m
pf
00
f0 = 0, s￿ 2 [0;n) and p￿ = ￿
c
0(n)
f0(n): Intuitively, the level of the
standard does not a⁄ect the decision of the ￿rm, since the marginal ￿ne is constant. Therefore, any
standard which induces non-compliance is optimal in that case.
14Under linear ￿nes, condition (11) never holds, since our assumptions ensure tf0 (n ￿ s) > 0: Therefore,
under linear penalties and costly sanctioning, the optimal policy always induces compliance.





f00 < 0, which then implies c0 (n) + d0 (n) > 0; by (9):
12Then, ew = 1: The penalty is F (e ￿ s) = (e ￿ s)
2. Since f0 (0) = 0 and F0 = 0, the opti-
mal policy induces non-compliance for any m > 0; t > 0. From (10), n￿2+2p(n ￿ s) =
0 ) n =
2+2ps
1+2p : An interior solution for s follows from (11) and (12), which lead to
m = t(n ￿ s)




1+2p from (4); (9) reduces to n = 2￿ts
2￿t > s:
The latter implies s < (>)1 as long as t < (>)2: In any case, n > 1: For example, when
m = 1 and t = 1, the optimal policy is
￿
s = 1
2; p = 1
4
￿
, which induces n = 3
2: The resulting
penalty is (n ￿ s)
2 = 1 and the marginal penalty is 2(n ￿ s) = 2:
5 The Choice of the Appropriate Penalties
In this section, we discuss the selection of the penalty shape, as part of the regulatory
policy. A ￿ne F (e ￿ s) can be approximated by a second order degree polynomial:
F (e ￿ s) ’ F0 + f





where F0 ￿ 0 is the non-gravity part of the sanction, and f0 (0) ￿ 0 and f00 (0) ￿ 0 are,
respectively, the linear and progressive gravity components.
The most appropriate shape of the penalties is presented in the following:
Proposition 4 If the optimal policy induces compliance, a linear ￿ne is (weakly) pre-
ferred to any other ￿ne structure. Conversely, if the optimal policy induces non-compliance,
then the best shape is su¢ ciently progressive and such that F0 = 0.
First, assume that the optimal policy induces compliance. As long as F0 > 0, the
￿rm complies at the optimal inspection probability pc (s), see (6): The larger the ￿ne,
the lower the probability, and consequently, the lower the monitoring costs. But only
the total amount of the ￿ne matters, since the particular structure does not a⁄ect ￿rm￿ s
13behavior (other than complying versus non-complying). However, if F0 = 0, the optimal
probability satis￿es p = ￿
c0(s)
f0(0). The probability can be decreased increasing the linear
component f0 (0), in exchange for a lower progressive component f00 (0).
Things change when the optimal policy induces non-compliance. The regulator should
not impose non-gravity sanctions, since they a⁄ect sanctioning costs but not ￿rm￿ s be-
havior (other than complying versus non-complying). The level of non-compliance can be
better controlled under a large progressive sanction. By (5), the larger f00, the smaller the
degree of non-compliance when s decreases. Therefore, enforcement costs can be lowered
if the progressive part of the sanction is increased at the expense of the linear part.
But, is compliance socially better than non-compliance once the shape of the penalties
can be chosen accordingly? From a strict social cost minimizing perspective, the answer is
yes.16 Stranlund (2007) shows that for any non-compliant policy, there exists a compliant
policy which achieves the same emissions target with lower marginal penalties. This result
can be immediately translated to our context, even when the induced pollution level is
endogenously determined here and exogenously given in Stranlund (2007).
However, the regulator might be confronted with a political dilemma. Industry groups
prefer compliant policies. In that case, standards should be relaxed and penalties should
be linear. However, environmental groups may question the polluter pays principle and
may prefer policies that make ￿rms responsible for (most of) the damages caused. If the
social pressure of these later groups is high, non-compliant policies composed of su¢ ciently
progressive penalties and rather low standards should be implemented.






with a linear penalty
F (e ￿ s) = 2(e ￿ s) induces compliance and it is socially preferred, since there are no sanctioning costs:
146 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied optimal policies composed of pollution standards, inspection
probabilities and sanctions dependant both on gravity and non-gravity-based components.
From a strict social point of view, the optimal policy consists of a standard above the
pollution level which minimizes the sum of abatement costs and external damages, the
minimum probability needed to induce compliance and a linear gravity sanction.
We have also characterized the policies which induce non-compliance. As long as
sanctioning costs are su¢ ciently low, the optimal standard is below the pollution level
which minimizes the sum of abatement costs and external damages and the penalty is
su¢ ciently progressive in the degree of non-compliance. Fixed sanctions should not be
imposed, since they only cause sanctioning costs but no change in ￿rms￿behavior.
Non-compliant policies agree with the polluter-pays-principle, and can be justi￿ed on
political grounds. Some recent settlements seem to be consistent with our ￿ndings, where
almost all the penalty is gravity-based. In January 2007, M.G. Waldbaum Company
agreed to pay a $1 million penalty to resolve Clean Water Act violations and around
$16 million to construct a wastewater treatment plant. In September 2006, the EPA and
P￿ ueger reached a settlement of over $7.5 million, $5.3 of which were expenses in envi-
ronmental improvement projects associated with P￿ ueger￿ s company activities in Hawaii.
Non-compliance can be surely justi￿ed in a dynamic context, where ￿rms also decide
to invest in new technologies. Non-compliant policies create incentives to invest, since
￿rms￿expected costs are larger. Information imperfections such as inaccurate monitoring
can be alternative causes. All these considerations are left for further research.
157 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The Lagrangian of (1) is L(e;￿) = c(e) + pF (e ￿ s) ￿ ￿(e ￿ s);
where ￿ ￿ 0 is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. The optimality conditions are c0 (e) +
pf0 (e ￿ s) ￿ ￿ = 0; ￿(e ￿ s) = 0; ￿ ￿ 0; and e ￿ s ￿ 0:17
First consider F0 = 0 and ￿ ￿ 0, e = s. Then, ￿ = c0 (s)+pf0 (0) ￿ 0: If this does not
hold, then ￿ = 0 and e = n, such that c0 (n) + pf0 (n ￿ s) = 0. If F0 > 0; e(s;p) = s as
long as c(s) ￿ c(n) + pF (n ￿ s), and e(s;p) = n; otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the result, we ￿nd the condition under which the
induced pollution level converges to s. The Lagrangian of the problem is L(s;p;￿;￿i) =
c(e) + d(e) + pm + ptF (e ￿ s) + ￿fc0 (e) + pf0 (e ￿ s)g ￿ ￿1 (e ￿ s) ￿ ￿2s:
The optimality conditions with respect to (n;s;p) are, respectively, the following:18
[c
0 (n) + d
0 (n) + tpf
0] + ￿[c
00 (n) + pf
00] ￿ ￿1 = 0 (14)
m + tF + ￿f
0 = 0 (15)
￿1 ￿ ￿2 ￿ tpf
0 ￿ ￿pf
00 = 0 (16)
￿1 (n ￿ s) = 0; ￿2s = 0: (17)
The induced pollution level converges to s when ￿1 ￿ 0 and ￿2 ￿ 0. Combining (15)
and (16), and substituting n by s; we have ￿2 ￿￿1 = ￿tpf0 (0)+
m+tF0
f0(0) pf00 (0) ￿ 0: Since
n = s and n > 0, we then have ￿2 = 0. Thus, ￿1 ￿ 0 implies ￿tpf0 (0)+
m+tF0
f0(0) pf00 (0) ￿ 0.
17These conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for an optimum, since the objective function is strictly
convex and the inequality constraint is linear in e. Su¢ cient conditions are also guaranteed in the
regulator￿ s optimality problem, below.
18For analytical convenience, we consider the pollution level as a choice variable of the regulator,
although this variable is decided by the ￿rm in response to the regulatory policy, as noted in (3): The
problem we consider here is mathematically equivalent to the one where the regulator chooses (s;p)
knowing that the ￿rm chooses n = e(s;p) in response to the policy.
16Proof of Proposition 2. The result is easily obtained from (7); substituting
e(s;p) = s and p = p(s) given by (6):19
Proof of Proposition 3.The result follows considering the case where ￿1 = 0 (i.e.,
n > s) and combining the conditions (14) to (17), such that ￿2 ￿ 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. From (13), we have F 0 (e ￿ s) = f0 (e ￿ s) ’ f0 (0) +
f00 (0)(e ￿ s) and F 00 (e ￿ s) = f00 (e ￿ s) ’ f00 (0):
If the optimal policy induces compliance, ￿nes are not collected and, consequently,
there are sanctioning costs. Therefore, the larger the ￿nes, the lower the probability (see
(6)) and, consequently, the lower the social costs. If F0 > 0, once an exogenous limit
of the ￿ne has been achieved, it is not possible to decrease social costs changing the
penalty, since p =
c(s)￿c(n)
F0+f(n￿s): Conversely, if F0 = 0, the optimal probability is p = ￿
c0(s)
f0(0).
Therefore, the optimal ￿ne is one where f0 (0) is as high as possible and f00 (0) is as low
as possible, since only the ￿rst component a⁄ects the probability.
If the optimal policy induces non-compliance, from the Lagrangian of Proposition 1,
then F0 = 0. The ￿ne is kept constant as long as df0 (0) + n￿s
2 df00 (0) = 0: Di⁄erentiating
the Lagrangian of of Proposition 1 with respect to f0 (0) and f00 (0), and considering the












= pft(n ￿ s) + ￿gdf
0 (0) ￿ pft(n ￿ s) + 2￿gdf
0 (0) =
= ￿￿pdf
0 (0) > 0;
since ￿ < 0, see (15): Then, decreasing f0 (0) and increasing f00 (0) reduces social costs.
19For simplicity, we assume that the solution for the probability of inspection is interior, i.e., p￿ 2 (0;1):
This remains valid in Proposition 3, below.
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